The Implications of the Preferential Voting System in Sri Lanka’s Presidential Elections
Devinda de Silva, Avishka Jayaweera and Amindri Sinnathamby
The upcoming presidential election on 21 September 2024 is a unique moment in Sri Lanka’s history. For the first time since the introduction of the executive presidency, it is possible that no candidate will receive over 50% of the popular vote (although the possibility of an outright win should not be written off). Therefore, the election may ultimately be determined by preferential votes.
Preferential voting takes place when a voter selects the order of preference of candidates by marking, for example, ‘1’, ‘2’, and ‘3’ next to the respective candidate. If no one candidate receives more than 50% of the valid votes, the top two candidates are retained and all other candidates are eliminated from the race. Then the second and third preference votes of voters who cast first preferences for the eliminated candidates are counted, and if the top two candidates have received any of those second or third preference votes, those votes are added to their tallies.
Will the most popular candidate be the ultimate winner?
If the presidential election is determined by preferential votes, the winner may not necessarily be the candidate who is the most popular. For example, in a presidential election with four candidates, assume the candidates get the following number of first preference votes:
A: 4.3 million valid votes
B: 3.9 million valid votes
C: 1.1 million valid votes
D: 4.7 million valid votes
After counting first preference votes, the two candidates with the highest number of votes, candidates A (4.3 million) and D (4.7 million), advance to the next round, while the remaining candidates, B and C are eliminated. In the next round, the second and third preference votes of voters who marked a first preference for the eliminated candidates B and C are counted. If A or D receive such second preference votes (or in some cases, third preference votes if the second preference vote had been marked for an eliminated candidate) those votes are added to A and D’s respective tallies.
In this scenario, assume the second and third preferences were counted and added to A and D, resulting in A receiving a total of 5 million valid votes and D receiving a total of 4.9 million valid votes. In such a scenario, despite D having the greatest number of first preference votes (4.7 million), A would be the ultimate winner.
Consider separately the possibility that B had received a significant number of second preference votes from voters who marked a first preference for A and D. In fact, B would have received a total number of 5.1 million votes had they not been eliminated after the first round, and second preference votes in their favour been counted. In this context, B would have been prevented from winning the election despite arguably being the candidate with the greatest number of first and second preference votes.
These scenarios reflect the fact that under a preferential voting system, the winning candidate may not necessarily be the most popular candidate. However, there are arguments in favour of this system. Preferential voting permits voters to rank candidates based on their personal preference. This system prevents ‘vote-splitting’. For instance, in a First-Past-The-Post system, votes for like-minded candidates may be divided. This division may result in a less popular candidate winning. The ranking system remedies this ailment by ensuring that if a voter’s first choice is eliminated, their vote will still be counted towards a candidate with similar policies, ensuring a more representative outcome.
Political implications
A preferential voting system has both positive and negative implications. On the one hand, in a preferential voting system, to ensure a victory in the event of not receiving a 50% majority, a candidate would have to appeal to the broadest possible audience. This system incentivises candidates to design their campaign in a manner to target preference votes. They would attempt to avoid alienating their core supporter group but at the same time target the median voter. The 2024 presidential election in Sri Lanka has featured these types of campaigns. For instance, many of the candidates have focused on anticorruption and economic policies. Contrary to past elections, none of the main candidates’ central messages have revolved around ethnic or religious identity. Even the economic policies proposed, while some elements may vary, are not radically different. For example, the manifestos of all three major candidates show support for trade agreements, an aspect that in previous elections some candidates have strongly opposed. These features in electoral campaigns reflect the preferential voting system’s ability to cultivate more moderate leaders and minimise polarization.
On the other hand, as illustrated above, the preferential voting system may produce a winner who is not necessarily the top pick of the majority of the population. This political reality may have implications in terms of a government’s ability to formulate necessary but unpopular policies. For example, Sri Lanka will require a tough fiscal policy to ensure the country is able to meet debt repayment obligations and to avoid further deficits. Such a policy, though necessary, is unlikely to be popular. Implementing such a policy would thus require political will and political capital. If a winning candidate is perceived as not having the support of a majority of the population, such a policy would not be easy to sustain.
In this context, the parliamentary election that follows Sri Lanka’s 2024 presidential election will be crucial. If no party secures a majority of the seats in parliament, a fragile coalition will be needed to form a government. The question would then arise as to whether such a government would be able to enact crucial legislation and formulate necessary policies that facilitate Sri Lanka’s economic recovery.
It is, therefore, clear that from a certain perspective Sri Lanka’s preferential voting system during presidential elections can incentivise inclusive and moderate politics. Yet, the tradeoff that could come with such a system is that the government would lack the political capital and the clear popular mandate to institute much needed economic reforms.
The authors are attorneys-at-law and junior associates at LexAG.
